The Two Hypostases of Law in Weinberger’s Ontology: Norms and Life
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.60131/jlaw.2.2025.10695Keywords:
Dual Nature of Law, Ontology, Social Reality, Weinberger, Autopoietic System.Abstract
Determining the nature of law is one of the central issues in legal theory. According to Weinberger, law is a dynamic, living and autopoietic (self-generating) organism, which simultaneously encompasses two fundamental hypostases – norms and social life. Therefore, law is not merely a rigid system of rules and laws.
This is an attempt to analyse the dialectic between these two aspects and, at the same time, to overcome the traditional opposition between normative idealism and social reality. Weinberger seeks to bring out their harmonious co-existence within the framework of law. In his view, law is a holistic system which operates not only in accordance with legislation, but also with due regard to the social context, at both the individual and the collective level. Moreover, a sharp separation between theory and practice is inadmissible, as they are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. Weinberger therefore strives to connect theory and practice organically. Thus, law is a living and multifaceted system in which rules and social relations co-exist harmoniously.
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