დუალისტური კლასის აქციათა სტრუქტურა: თანამედროვე საკორპორაციო სამართლის გამოწვევა
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48614/jlaw.1.2022.4944საკვანძო სიტყვები:
აქციათა კლასები, ერთი კლასის აქციათა სტრუქტურა, დუალისტური კლასის აქციათა სტრუქტურა, „ერთი აქცია, ერთი ხმა“, კორპორაციული მართვა, სპეციალური დათქმა “Sunset Provision”, საფონდო ბირჟები.ანოტაცია
აქცია არის სააქციო საზოგადოების ფასიანი ქაღალდი. იგი ადასტურებს პარტნიორის (აქციონერის) სააქციო საზოგადოების კაპიტალში მონაწილეობას და სამართლებრივად განამტკიცებს მის პოზიციებსა და უფლებებს. არსებობს აქციათა სხვადასხვა კლასი, რომელიც ერთმანეთისგან უფლებრივი მდგომარეობით განსხვავდება. ერთი მათგანი ანიჭებს აქციონერს მმართველობით უფლებას (ჩვულებრივი აქცია), ხოლო მეორე არა და იგი მხოლოდ ქონებრივი უფლებით შემოიფარგლება (პრივილეგირებული აქცია).
თანამედროვე მსოფლიოში არსებული ტენდენციის მიხედვით, დიდი კორპორაციები მრავალფეროვანი კაპიტალის სტრუქტურით გამოირჩევიან ე.ი. ორი (ან მეტი) კლასის აქციებს უშვებენ ერთდროულად: როგორც ჩვეულებრივსა და პრივილეგირებულს, ისე ჩვეულებრივი აქციის რამოდენიმე კლასს, განსხვავებული ხმის უფლებით. განსაკუთრებით ეს დამახასიათებელია ისეთი მაღალტექნოლოგიური კომპანიებისათვის, როგორებიცაა Google, Facebook, Snap Inc. და ა.შ. მათ Dual Class Companies ანუ დუალისტური კლასის კომპანიებს უწოდებენ. როდესაც კომპანია ორი ან მეტი კლასის აქციებს უშვებს ეს დიდ რისკებთან და სირთულეებთან არის დაკავშირებული. მეცნიერებსა და ინვესტორებში აზრთა სხვადასხვაობას იწვევს, სხვადასხვა კლასის აქციების გამოშვება საზიანოა თუ სასარგებლო კომპანიისათვის? საერთოდ, რატომ მიმართავენ კორპორაციები ამ გზას? რა დადებითი ან უარყოფითი გავლენა შეიძლება მოახდინონ აქციათა კლასებმა კორპორაციულ მართვაზე? ასევე, რა დატვირთვა აქვს აქციონერს საზოგადოების მართვაში? წინამდებარე ნაშრომში სწორედ დასახელებული საკითხები იქნება განხილული; როგორი მიდგომები არსებობს განვითარებული ეკონომიკის მქონე ქვეყნებში და რა მეთოდებს მიმართავენ ისინი კორპორაციული მართვის სრულყოფისათვის.
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